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Abstract 
 This paper explores the determinants of female land rights and their impact on household 
income levels among owner-operated farms in Brazil, Paraguay and Peru.  Previous studies in 
Latin America suggest that the gender of the household head is not a significant predictor of 
household income, not unsurprising given the ambiguities with which self-declared headship is 
associated.  We hypothesize that female land rights, by increasing women’s options, are a 
positive determinant of household income, but given the disadvantages that they face as farmers, 
that their land rights will more likely impact upon off-farm rather than farm income.  Regression 
analysis indicates that female land rights are positively related to off-farm income in Peru and 
Paraguay, but significantly so only in the case of dual-headed households in Peru where the 
bargaining power thesis is operative.  They are negatively associated with farm income in both 
countries and with farm revenue in Brazil.   
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Introduction 
 
Do women’s land rights make a difference in terms of welfare outcomes for women and their 
families?  Feminist theory strongly supports this proposition.  As Agarwal (1994) has argued and 
Deere and León (2001) and others elaborated upon, women’s lands rights should enhance their 
welfare, efficiency and bargaining power and hence contribute to their empowerment as well as 
their attainment of real equality with men.  Yet in the case of Latin America the quantitative 
empirical evidence supporting these propositions is relatively thin.  This paper thus explores the 
impact of female land rights on household income levels in three South American countries—
Brazil, Paraguay and Peru—addressing the question of whether female land rights contribute to 
higher rural household incomes and if so, if their impact is through farm or off-farm income.   
 
There is a growing literature showing the importance of off-farm income and specifically, non-
agricultural income, to rural households in Latin America. Reardon, Berdegué and Escobar 
(2001), summarizing household surveys undertaken for twelve countries in the 1990s, report that 
non-agricultural income accounts for a weighted average of 40 percent of rural household 
incomes.  But only a few of the econometric studies that investigate the determinants of the level 
and composition of rural household income have taken gender into account.  Those that do only 
consider the gender of the self-declared household head.  Studies of Chile, Nicaragua, and Peru 
suggest that the gender of the household head is not a significant predictor of total household 
income levels (Berdegué, et. al. 2001; Escobal 2001; Corral and Reardon 2001).   
 
This result is not too surprising given the ambiguities with which self-declared headship is 
associated (Rosenhouse 1994; Rogers 1995; Buvinic and Gupta 1997).  For example, a female-
headed household does not necessarily mean that no male is present or that the principal, adult 
female of the household does not have a partner.   Similarly, a male-headed household does not 
always correspond to one where the man is the main income earner or contributor to the 
household.  Cultural norms in Latin America, backed by legal codes until recently, have 
supported the practice of  considering the husband the head if a household includes a married 
couple.  Nonetheless, sometimes other factors, such as temporary male absence or even if a man 
is present, the woman’s higher earnings or greater ownership of assets or age lead women to 
declare themselves the household head.   Such cases are not uncommon and may be related to 
the prevalence of consensual unions rather than formal marriages.   All of these factors suggest 
that self-declared headship is a problematic variable for the investigation of gender differences 
among rural households. 
 
Few household surveys until recently inquired into the ownership of assets such as land and the 
gender of the owner.  The usual assumption in the agrarian studies literature is that owner-
operated farms are the property of the household head.  As Deere and León (2001, 2003) argue, 
this is an unsatisfactory assumption for several reasons.  First,  a “family farm” is often made up 
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of a number of parcels, each which may have different ownership.  These parcels may be owned 
independently by the husband or wife, jointly by them, or in co-ownership with other family 
members or others. Second, legal property rights within marriage are defined according to the 
marital regime under which a couple contracts marriage.2  In most Latin American countries 
couples may choose among several options and the default regime (that which governs if no 
option is declared) varies by country.  Moreover, consensual unions are quite prevalent in rural 
areas of a number of Latin American countries and their legal status and hence, property rights, 
also vary by country. 
 
In this study we go beyond previous work on the determinants of rural household income levels 
by testing for the impact of female land rights on income levels among households with owner-
operated farms.  We also distinguish between dual-headed households (characterized by the 
presence of a couple consisting of an adult man and woman), those with a self-declared female 
head, and those female-headed households with no adult male present.3  Following the recent 
literature, we employ the term “dual-headed” or “two-headed” as a demographic category, one 
that makes no assumptions about power relations within the household, to distinguish them from 
households with only a single working-age adult or head (Hamilton 1998).  This convention also 
conforms to recent legal changes in Latin American civil codes that vest formal headship on both 
husband and wife for purposes ranging from household representation, to management of the 
community property of the couple, to control over and responsibility for children (Deere and 
León 2001). 
 
We hypothesize that female land rights should have a positive impact on all types of households 
since land ownership should improve the options of all rural women.  Specifically, female land 
rights should increase women’s economic autonomy by allowing them greater choice in whether 
to concentrate their efforts on agricultural production or to diversify into off-farm activities.  To 
the extent that off-farm opportunities are available, we expect that women’s ownership and 
control of assets might allow them to undertake more remunerative off-farm activities either 
because of a credit effect (due to the role of land as collateral) or because women landowners are 
able to rent or sharecrop their land and use this income as capital for off-farm activities. 
 
A bargaining power hypothesis is only directly relevant to dual-headed households, those that 
have both an adult man and women present.  In this case we expect female land rights, by 
enhancing their fall-back position, to increase women’s bargaining power within the household  
and for their greater bargaining power to result in a greater efficiency of household labor 
 
2  Until recently, the bargaining power literature largely ignored the property rights implications 
of different marital regimes.  See Fafchamps and Quisumbing (2002) for an insightful analysis of 
the importance of this variable in Ethiopia.   
3  We exclude truly male-headed households (where no adult female is present) from our analysis 
since our interest is in testing the impact of female land rights.     
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allocation.  Greater bargaining power should result in women’s greater participation in 
household decision-making allowing them, for example, to overcome chauvinistic male 
preferences regarding their participation outside the home.  Women’s greater participation in 
decision-making could also result in more efficient decisions because these are based on a higher 
degree of consensus.  Increases in women’s bargaining power may also impact positively upon 
household income indirectly, by increasing labor productivity as a result of the greater attention 
paid to health care and education in maternal spending patterns.    
 
The bulk of the literature inspired by a bargaining power framework has focused on the intra-
household allocation of resources (Haddad, Hoddindot and Alderman 1997).  The main 
hypothesis that has been tested empirically in the Latin American case is that the enhanced 
bargaining power of women within the household as a result of their owning land leads to 
different expenditure patterns, reflecting gender-based preferences.  Katz and Chamorro (2003), 
for example, show that female land rights in Honduras and Nicaragua lead to small, but positive 
and significant increases on expenditures on food and child education attainment.   
 
Here we test a different hypothesis:  that female land rights in dual-headed households should 
impact positively upon net household income primarily because women’s increased bargaining 
power results in higher levels of off-farm income. We expect off-farm income, rather than farm 
income, to be positively influenced by women’s land rights due to the noted disadvantages faced 
by women farmers—less access to land, inputs, credit, technical assistance, etc. (Deere and León 
2001). Unfortunately, data limitations do not allow us to explore the precise mechanisms that 
promote greater efficiency in household labor allocation.  
 
The recent availability of three data sets that include information on the gender of the landowner 
allow us to test the general hypothesis and to investigate the determinants of women’s land 
rights.  The Paraguayan and Peruvian data are from the nationally representative Living Standard 
and Measurement Surveys (LSMS), sponsored by the World Bank  The Brazilian data are from a 
national survey of commercial farmers.4  Our analysis focuses on the sub-set of owner-operated 
farm households.5 The three countries are all South American middle-income countries with per 
 
4 The Paraguayan LSMS is known as the 2000-01 MECOVI (Mejoramiento de las Encuestas de 
las Condiciones de Vida) and was carried out by the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock, 
Asunción.  It includes information on 8,131 households, 40.5 percent of which are rural.  The 
Peruvian LSMS is the 2000 ENNIV (Encuesta Nacional de Niveles de Vida) and was carried out 
by the Instituto Cuanto, Lima.  It consists of 3,977 households, 34.2 percent of which are rural.  
The Brazilian farm survey, the Censo Comunitario Rural 2000, was carried out by the 
Confederação Nacional Agraria and includes 39,904 commercial farms, defined as proprietors 
with farms larger than 50 hectares. 
5 Outliers with respect to farm size and/or net household income (defined as being greater than 
five standard deviations from the mean) were excluded from the three sub-samples.  In addition, 
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capita incomes below the regional mean, and with an important share of their rural population 
with incomes below national poverty lines.6  In addition, they all have the same default marital 
regime, that of partial community property, known as gananciales (participation in profits).7
 
In the next section we define our various measures of women’s land rights and control over land 
and set the stage for the comparative analysis.  The third section addresses how women acquire 
land and here we develop a Logit model of the determinants of women’s land rights.  The fourth 
section presents estimates of net household income and its composition.  In the fifth section we 
present regressions on the determinants of household, farm, and off-farm income.  The final 
section offers some tentative conclusions. 
 
Our main finding is that female land rights have heterogeneous effects in the three countries, but 
rarely is the gender of the self-declared household head a significant variable. Only in the case of 
Peru do we find a large, positive and significant association between female land rights and net 
household income.  In both Paraguay and Peru female land rights are positively associated with 
higher off-farm income levels, but only significantly so in the case of dual-headed households in 
Peru where the bargaining power thesis is operative.  In Peru female land rights, evaluated at the 
mean, increases off-farm income by over 400 percent and net household income by 47 percent.  
In both Paraguay and Peru female land rights are negatively associated with the level of farm 
income, but only significantly so in the case of Paraguay;  in Brazil,  female land rights are  
negatively associated with the level of farm revenue.   
 
 
Measures of Women’s Land Rights and Control   
 
Of the three surveys, land rights are defined most precisely with respect to gender in the 
Peruvian case since data on ownership was gathered at the parcel rather than at the household 
 
the Brazilian sample was truncated at 2,020 hectares in order to provide some degree of 
comparability between the three case studies since the Brazilian sample (by design) excludes 
farms smaller than fifty hectares. 
6 Gross National Income per capita for Latin America and the Caribbean in 2001 was $3,560; the 
corresponding figures are $3,060 for Brazil, $2,000 for Peru and $1,300 for Paraguay (World 
Bank 2003: 234-35). In Peru (1997 data), 64.7 percent of the rural population was below the 
national poverty line; in Brazil (1990), 32.6 percent; and in Paraguay (1991), 28.5 percent (Ibid.: 
236-37). 
7 Under this marital regime all property acquired before marriage remains the individual property 
of each spouse, as does property acquired through inheritance or donations during the marriage.  
All assets acquired via wages, salaries, rents and profits during the marriage constitute the 
community property (gananciales) of the couple.  In case of dissolution of the marriage for 
whatever reason, the gananciales are divided into equal shares.  In all three countries couples 
living in consensual unions now have almost the same property rights as legally married couples 
(Deere and León 2001). 
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level. The Peruvian questionnaire followed a two-step process to define land rights.  First, it was 
asked if each parcel “belongs to the respondent or another household member.”  Then, after 
asking what kind of document they had for the parcel, it was asked if the title was in the name of 
the household head, the spouse, both of them, another family member, or in co-property with a 
family member or another person.8  Restricting this sub-sample of plots further, to those whose 
owners reside in the household and can be identified by sex, results in information for 1,908 
plots: 12.7 percent of these are owned by women, 74.4 by men, and 12.9 percent are jointly 
owned by the household head and spouse.  
        
Since data on plot ownership by sex is only available for Peru (this data having been collected at 
the level of the farm household in Paraguay), it is necessary to convert the plot-level data into a 
comparable characterization of households according to land ownership.  This was done by 
specifying all the different combinations of parcel ownership by sex at the household level .  The 
number of owner-operated, farming households has now been reduced due to missing 
information to 871.  Applying the sample weights,  11.5 percent are characterized by female-
only plots, 71.5 percent by male-only plots, 3 percent by mixed ownership (both female and 
male plots), and 14 percent by joint ownership of all plots (Table 1).   
      
An alternative specification is to characterize these households according to whether or not the 
women within them have some degree of land rights.  By this measure, some 28.5 percent of the 
Peruvian farming households are characterized by having some female land rights (Table 1).  
This figure is far higher than the share of self-declared female-headed households which is only 
8.9 percent.  The majority of women with land rights (71.4 percent) live in self-declared male-
headed or dual-headed households.  Nonetheless, women have land rights in only 22.3 percent of 
these dual-headed households, but in 91.6 percent of the self-declared female-headed 
households, with the difference by gender of household head being significant.9
 
Turning to the Paraguayan survey, since data on property rights was not reported for each parcel, 
it is only possible to characterize land ownership by sex at the level of the household. 
Respondents who worked in independent agricultural activities were first asked if they owned 
their own land, followed by in whose name was the property title, with the possibility for them to 
give three responses, including if the property title was not in the name of a household 
member.10 The subsequent analysis is based on 1,678 farm households;  of these, and applying 
                                                           
8 The first query yielded information on 2,348 owner-operated parcels corresponding to 1,082 
farming households.  Considerable information (data on 14.4 percent of the parcels) was lost by 
the property rights question being limited to only those parcels with a formal document, 
reflecting the persistent high degree of tenure insecurity in Peru. 
9 To avoid tediousness, whenever we use the term “significant” we refer to the result being 
statistically significant at least at the 90 percent level of confidence. 
10 A large share of the farming households (37.1 percent) do not have a title for their property, 
thus information on property rights by gender is lost. In an additional 7.8 percent of the 
households, the title is held by a non-household member whose sex is unknown.   
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the sample weights, 28 percent are characterized by female-only land rights, 69.2 percent by 
male-only land rights, and 2.8 percent by mixed or joint land rights (Table 1). Given the manner 
the data was collected, it is impossible to further disaggregate this latter category, as was done 
for Peru.  
 
Households can be further distinguished as those with some female land rights (30.8 percent) 
and those without them (69.2 percent). As in Peru, the share of households with some female 
land rights in Paraguay is greater than the share of self-declared female-headed households, 24.6 
percent, which in itself is quite high.  As expected, women are more likely to have land rights in 
self-declared female-headed (84.8 percent) as opposed to male, or dual-headed households (13.2 
percent), a difference that is statistically significant.  In contrast to Peru, a majority of  the 518 
households with female land rights (67.6 percent) are self-declared female-headed households; 
one-quarter of these female heads have a male partner residing in the household. 
 
Since the Brazilian survey was aimed at farm proprietors, the questionnaire did not delve further 
into property rights, beyond the land tenancy question.  It is thus assumed that the proprietor is, 
indeed, the sole owner.11  Hence, for Brazil, the share of households with female land rights is 
the same as the share of self-declared female and male household heads, 10.5 and 89.5 percent, 
respectively, for the sub-set of 22,805 households (Table 1).  What made the Brazilian survey of 
particular interest was that it asked a question not addressed in the LSMS:  Who is the farm 
manager?  This is a critical question since it cannot be assumed that the farm owner is always the 
principal person making the decisions regarding agricultural production and its disposition.  As 
Agarwal (1994) argues, it is not just land rights, but land rights combined with effective control 
over production that should lead to better outcomes for women.  In the Brazilian survey 83.8 
percent of the farms are managed by their owners. Female owners are much less likely (56.8 
percent) to also be the farm administrator than are male owners (87 percent), a statistically 
significant difference.  As a result, women manage only 7 percent of the owner-operated farms 
(Table 1).   
 
For Paraguay and Peru the farm manager had to be deduced.  After considering various 
approaches, we settled on a “labor theory of management,” attributing control to the adult in the 
household who dedicated the most time to agricultural production.12  Our manager variable 
 
11 This assumption ignores the fact that property rights in marriage are determined by the 
specific marital regime under which matrimony is contracted.  Since 1977 the default regime in 
Brazil is partial community property (comunhão parcial), but prior to that date it was full 
community property, whereby all property irrespective of how it was acquired constituted the 
common property of the couple.  The failure to ask about the marital regime, or if the property 
was jointly owned with the spouse, probably underestimates the degree of female ownership of 
land in Brazil. 
12 This information was taken from the EAP data of the LSMS survey and was based on the 
primary and secondary activity of household members engaged in independent agricultural 
production, whether they reported themselves to be independent producers or unremunerated 
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probably corresponds well to participation in day-to-day decision making, such as regarding 
what task is to be carried out and by whom.  This measure does not necessarily capture who in 
the household makes the major farm decisions such as what crops to plant, the use of credit and 
choice of technology or marketing decisions.  By this measure, in Paraguay women are the 
managers in 15.3 percent of the households, men in 54.5 percent, and 30.2 percent are jointly 
managed.  The corresponding figures for Peru are 21.8,  56.1, and 22.1 percent, respectively 
(Table 1). 
       
Table 1 also presents data on the average amount of land owned by households with and without 
female land rights and by form of title category, self-declared household headship, and farm 
management. The means of land owned capture some of the basic differences characterizing the 
agricultural sector in each country, with Brazil and Paraguay reporting much larger farms, on 
average, than Peru.  The Brazilian survey is truncated, since the survey is limited to commercial 
farms above 50 hectares in size and we have capped it at 2,020 hectares.  In class terms, this 
survey is heavily weighted towards what may be considered the rural petty bourgeoisie or minor 
capitalists (roughly, those in the 100-500 has. range) and the better-off peasantry (50-100 has.).   
 
Both the Paraguayan and Peruvian surveys are nationally representative of the distribution of 
property ownership.  Since Peru had a relatively substantive agrarian reform in the 1970s, the 
overwhelming number of farms are small and owned by the peasantry.  In contrast, Paraguay, 
which has not had an agrarian reform, has a more typical Latin American profile with respect to 
the distribution of land by property ownership.  In class terms, its agrarian structure is more 
heterogenous than that of Peru, and the sample includes the peasantry (roughly, those in the 
0.01-50 has. range) as well as agrarian capitalists.  It is thus important to keep in mind that the 
women landowners who are the focus of our analysis are quite heterogenous in class terms.   
 
In both Brazil and Paraguay households with some female land rights tend to own less land than 
those without them, with this difference being statistically significant (Table 1).  With respect to 
headship, self-declared female-headed households own less land on average than male or dual-
headed households, with the difference in means being quite significant in the case of Paraguay, 
less so in Brazil and not significant at all in Peru.  In terms of management, in Brazil and 
Paraguay the average amount of land owned by male owner-managers is significantly greater 
than that of female owner-managers, with this difference not of significance in Peru.   Gender 
 
family members.  If the difference in the time dedicated by each of the principal adults was one 
month or less the household was taken as being characterized by “joint management.”  In the 
Peruvian data set information was also available on the number of hours worked per week.  In 
the case where there was a large difference in the number of months worked between two adults, 
but the number of hours worked per year suggested differently, a second procedure was 
followed.  A ratio was created of the total number of hours worked by the two household 
members with the most hours employed.  If the ratio exceeded 1.25, then the person with the 
greatest number of hours was characterized as the manager.  If the ratio was less than or equal to 
1.25 then the farm was characterized as being jointly managed. 
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inequality in land owned by these various measures thus appears to be greater in Paraguay and 
Brazil than in Peru. 
 
Women’s Acquisition of Land  
  
How have women landowners acquired their ownership of land?  Data on the form of acquisition 
is only available in the Brazilian and Peruvian surveys.  Both countries conform to the pattern 
reported by Deere and León (2003): inheritance tends to be the primary means by which women 
acquire land in Latin America.  In both countries market purchases follow inheritance in order of 
magnitude, with relatively few women acquiring land through other means, such as via agrarian 
reform or community distribution (Table 2). 
 
Given that the majority of land is owned by men and that the main way that women acquire land 
is through inheritance, it is relevant to consider whether women are more likely to inherit land as 
daughters or from their husbands, as widows.  Direct information on this question is not 
available in the surveys; however, we can drawn some inferences based on the marital status of 
the women landowners.  Table 3 presents this data for the three countries.  Whereas in Peru the 
overwhelming majority (70.7 percent) of women landowners are married or in a consensual 
union, as are the majority in Paraguay (55.8 percent), in Brazil less than one-third of them have 
permanent companions,13 with most women landowners in this country being widows. 
 
     Cross tabs revealed that in Brazil 55 percent of the widows acquired their land through 
inheritance.  For the relatively few single women in the Brazil sample (14 percent of the total 
female landowners), inheritance was even more important, with 60 percent acquiring their land 
through this means.  In contrast, only one-third of the women with permanent companions 
inherited land, with market purchases being relatively more important among this group.  The 
survey data conform to the qualitative literature on inheritance of land in Brazil which stresses 
how sons are the preferred heirs and that women become landowners primarily through 
widowhood14 or as daughters if there are no male heirs (Carneiro 2002). 
 
 
13  The Brazilian data set did not distinguish between formally married women and those in a 
consensual union perhaps because in this country they have equivalent property rights.  We use 
the term ‘women with permanent companions’ to encompass both groups. 
14 As noted earlier, until 1977 the default marital regime in Brazil was full community property 
(comunhão total) where all assets irrespective of how they were acquired were jointly owned by 
the couple. Upon the death of the husband 50 percent of the assets passed automatically to the 
widow and she could inherit up to an additional one-third of her husband’s patrimony if he 
designated such in a will.  If he died intestate she only had usufruct rights over one-quarter of his 
patrimony as long as she did not remarry.  Since 1977 the default marital regime is that of partial 
community property, meaning that only assets acquired during marriage are pooled and divided 
in half upon termination of the union. 
 
 
 
 11 
                                                          
In Peru, where the overwhelming share of female landowners are married or in a consensual 
union, cross tabs on the acquisition of parcels also show that widows and single women were 
more likely to have inherited land than women with permanent companions (79 and 94 percent 
vs. 57 percent).   In contrast to Brazil, however, in Peru inheritance was more important than the 
market as the main form of acquisition of land by women with permanent companions. 
Nonetheless, in both countries such women were more likely to have acquired land through the 
market than either widows or single women. 
 
What factors increase the likelihood of women acquiring land?  We hypothesize that female 
ownership of land is positively associated with whether a woman’s parents are landowners, the 
amount of land they own, as well as the gender composition of a woman’s siblings (with a 
woman more likely to inherit land if she has no brothers); widowhood; age (since a woman is 
more likely to inherit land from her parents or husband when she is older), household headship, 
and education.  We would expect women with more education to be able to defend their potential 
land rights more successfully; in addition, education serves as a proxy for labor market 
opportunities and hence the possibility of purchasing land independently.  In countries with the 
partial community property marital regime, marriage should also increase  the likelihood of 
women acquiring land through the market, for if the couple is able to purchase land it should 
legally pertain to both of them.  
 
Unfortunately, information is not available in our data sets on the landholdings of a woman’s 
parents.  We thus estimate a Logit model of the determinants of female land rights based on the 
marital status of the adult women in the sample,15 age, and dummies for headship (1 = female 
 
15  We have created dummies grouping together women who are married, in a consensual union 
or separated, and for women who are widows or divorced, with the default dummy being single 
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household head) and literacy (1 = literate).16   This specification is not without its problems, 
given the expected high correlation between marital status and household headship.17
 
 
women. The rationale for this grouping is as follows.  Under the default marital regime of partial 
community property if the couple purchased land during the union, it should form part of the 
common property of the couple and be registered as joint property.  In the case of divorce or 
widowhood, such purchased land should be divided equally between the two patrimonies, with 
this land appearing in the survey as female-only land. 
16  We chose literacy as the independent variable since we thought that the ability to read and 
write would be more important than actual years of schooling in determining a woman’s ability 
to defend her land rights.  Given the gender bias in the education of women that has existed in 
rural areas until recently, there is not always a clear correspondence between literacy and the 
number of years of formal education.  The gender gap in education is particularly acute in Peru, 
less so in Paraguay (Table 8), and has disappeared in Brazil (Table 15). The Brazilian sample 
contains few illiterates, thus in the Logit regression we use a dummy for completion of primary 
school rather than literacy. 
17  This is more of a problem in Peru than Paraguay, for the latter country shows more diversity in 
the marital status of female household heads, with almost one-third of these having a husband or 
partner compared to only five percent in Peru.  The main problem this high correlation leads to is 
multicollinearity, leading to imprecise estimates. 
The regression results for the three countries are presented in Table 4.  While all the regressions 
are significant (F test), the pseudo R-squared statistics range from 0.3727 for Paraguay to 0.1531 
for Peru.  In the Brazilian regression, female land rights are positively and significantly 
associated with completion of primary education and widowhood and negatively and 
significantly associated with age and marriage.  The negative coefficient on age is surprising. It 
could reflect the possibility that younger women who have more education are more likely to 
retain their land (not selling out to siblings or children) than older women.  The negative 
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coefficient on marriage reflects the fact that joint titling of land to married couples is a rare 
practice in Brazil. 
 
For Peru, the model predicts that households are more likely to have female land rights if they 
are female-headed and the woman is older, with only these coefficients being significant; the 
coefficient for female literacy, nonetheless, is also positive.  Neither coefficient of the dummies 
for marital status was significant, with that for marriage being positive (probably reflecting the 
more frequent practice of joint titling in Peru than in the other countries) and that for widowhood 
negative. 
 
For Paraguay, the results are similar to those for Peru, with whether women in the household 
have land rights being positively and significantly associated with female headship and a 
woman’s age.  The coefficient for female literacy again, while positive, is not significant.   The 
coefficient on marriage is negative and significant, so marriage does not seem to be an effective 
strategy for acquiring land:  married women are even less likely than single women (the default 
dummy) to acquire land rights.  Since the coefficient on widowhood is also negative (although 
not significant), this provides indirect evidence that the main way that women might acquire land 
is through inheritance as daughters and that landowners may be more likely to leave land to a 
daughter who is single.  Obviously, more rigorous work on the determinants of women’s land 
rights will have to await the elaboration of household surveys with more appropriate data. 
 
Female Land Rights and Household Income and its Composition 
 
The income figures in the Brazilian survey are self-reported, monthly household income 
estimates and are thus not of the quality of the detailed LSMS income estimates.  While they will 
not be the subject of econometric analysis, the results are of interest as an indicator of the diverse 
class composition of the three surveys and for what they reveal about gender differences.  As 
Table 5 shows, reported annual household income is higher in the Brazilian survey of 
commercial farmers than in the other two countries, where the estimates are based on net 
household income and nationally representative household surveys. Household size was not 
reported in the Brazilian survey so per capita incomes cannot be even loosely compared.   
 
The estimate of net household income per capita for Peru of $453 is considerably below the 
reported 2001 national income per capita of $2,000.   This is consistent with the fact that almost 
two-thirds of rural inhabitants in Peru live below the national poverty line.  Moreover, since our 
sub-sample includes only owner-operated farm households, we would expect the mean per capita 
household income to be above that for the rural population as a whole.  In Paraguay, a much 
smaller share of the rural population live below the national poverty line so we would expect the 
mean per capita income of our survey to approximate the national mean of $1,300.  Per capita 
income among survey households, $1,651, slightly exceeds this figure.    
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With respect to gender differences,  for Brazil the difference in reported annual household 
income is statistically significant, with female landowners/household heads reporting lower 
incomes.  In Paraguay, households with female land rights are also poorer than those without 
them, with the difference in household income being statistically significant at the 90 percent 
level; the difference in terms of income per capita, however, is not significant.   In contrast, in 
Peru households with female land rights are significantly better off in terms of both net 
household income and income per capita.  A more detailed analysis by title category revealed 
that this difference is primarily due to the much higher incomes of households with mixed and 
joint land titles.18   
 
With respect to income quintiles, Table 5 confirms that in Brazil, households with female land 
rights (equivalent to female-headed households in this survey) are over-represented in the lower 
three quintiles,19  with the gender difference being statistically significant.  In Paraguay, the 
quintile analysis reveals no significant differences overall according to female land rights; 
however, households with female land rights are over-represented  in the second lowest income 
quintile, explaining why mean incomes among households with female land rights are lower 
overall than those without them.  The quintile analysis for Peru demonstrates that households 
with female land rights are over-represented among the top two quintiles and under-represented 
among the lower two, resulting in a significant difference in the distribution between households 
with and without female land rights. 
 
In terms of self-declared household headship, in Paraguay, as in Brazil, female-headed 
households are significantly poorer than male-headed ones.  In Peru in contrast, the difference in 
mean net household income is not statistically significant. 
 
As noted earlier, one of the trends reported throughout Latin America in the 1990s was the 
growing importance of  non-agricultural income among rural households.  Our LSMS surveys 
conform to this trend, even though we focus on owner-operated farm households rather than all 
rural households.   In Paraguay, farm income constitutes 44 percent of  mean total net income  
while the contribution of agricultural wage income is miniscule, less than two percent; all told, 
54 percent of  total household income is generated from non-agricultural activities (Table 6). For 
Peru, characterized by much smaller farms than Paraguay, net farm income constitutes slightly 
less than one-third of total net household income; adding agricultural wage income to this figure 
means that only 38 percent of household income is generated via the agricultural sector, with 62 
percent from non-agricultural activities (Table 7).  
 
 
18  Mean net household income in Peru for households with mixed titles is $2,740 and for joint 
titles, $2,665. 
19 To put the Brazilian figures into perspective, the lower quintile of the income distribution is 
earning approximately $100 per month, only slightly above the minimum wage in Brazil in 
2000. The top quintile is earning 22.5 times that amount. 
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Among Peruvian land-owning households net farm income is followed in magnitude by non-
agricultural wage income, income from commercial activities (of all types), income from other 
independent activities, and rental income.   Households with and without female land rights 
differ only slightly in the rank ordering of the sources of household income, with the top five 
sources being the same.  Where they differ is that households without female land rights are 
more dependent on farm income (33.5 percent) than those with female land rights (28.5 percent); 
the latter earn higher absolute net incomes from farm activities, but the differences in net farm 
income are not statistically significant (Table 7). 
 
Peruvian households with female land rights are more diversified than those without them, with a 
significantly higher share of the former participating in non-agricultural wage labor, commerce 
and earning incomes from remittances.   In the income-generating activities where their 
participation rates are higher, they tend to earn higher net incomes, with the difference in means 
being significant in the case of non-agricultural wage income and commerce income, in addition 
to other independent sources of income.    
 
In Paraguay, farm income is followed in magnitude by non-agricultural wage income, other 
income (pensions and extraordinary income), and income from other independent activities 
(artisan production and services) (Table 6).  Households with and without some female land 
rights exhibit the same rank ordering with respect to the top four income generating activities.  
Where they differ most is with respect to their dependence on farm income, this rubric 
comprising only slightly over a quarter of the total net income of those with female land rights 
but half of the total net income of households without them.  Moreover, the differences in mean 
net farm income are significant, being over twice as large in households without female land 
rights. Households with female land rights are also more diversified in Paraguay, but this does 
not work to their advantage.  While they show significantly higher participation rates in non-
agricultural wage labor, other independent income, rental income, remittances and in earning 
other income, only in the case of remittances are their mean earnings significantly higher as 
compared with households without female land rights.   
 
Finally, in terms of the gender of the household head, in both Paraguay and Peru the lower net 
household income of self-declared female-headed households is largely explained by their much 
lower net farm incomes, with this difference being significant for both countries.   In both,  
female-headed households rely more on non-agricultural incomes.  But in Peru there is no 
apparent difference by gender in participation rates in non-farm activities.  In contrast, in 
Paraguay, female-headed households show significantly higher participation rates in agricultural 
wage employment, commerce activities and in remittance incomes.  Nonetheless, this translates 
into a significant income advantage only in the case of remittances.  In Peru female-headed 
households earn significantly more on average than male-headed households only in the case of 
other incomes but this difference is also insufficient to overcome their disadvantage in terms of 
farm incomes. 
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Regression Analysis of the Determinants of Household, Farm and Off-Farm Income Levels 
 
We hypothesize that female land rights should be positively related to the level of net household 
income because women with land rights have greater options, and if in dual-headed households, 
greater bargaining power within households.  Their greater bargaining power should result in 
their greater participation in household decisions,  resulting in better and more efficient decisions 
with respect to labor allocation. 
 
Following the recent literature (Berdegué, Ramírez and Reardon, 2001; Corral and Reardon, 
2001; de Janvry and Sadoulet, 2001), we posit that net household income is a function of 
household characteristics (gender of household head,  household size, and the number of   
economically active adult members); human capital assets (years of schooling of each of the two 
principle adults); farm assets (the value of land, animal stocks and equipment, and farm size); 
distance to market (for Peru); and a regional dummy.  What is unique about our model is the 
inclusion of dummy variables for female land rights (1= some female land rights, FLR), for 
female-headed households with no adult male present (1 = NoMale) as well as self-declared 
female-headed households (1 = SexHead).  The log of net household income is the dependent 
variable.20
We estimate household income using a generalized least squares procedure (survey regression) 
to account for the use of survey weights that may compromise the independence of observations. 
 Model 1 includes all households in the sample. In order to specifically test the bargaining power 
hypothesis we ran the same regression on a restricted sample of those households with both 
adults present or the dual-headed households. In Model 2 SexHead and NoMale are dropped 
since they are no longer relevant.  The income regression means for Paraguay and Peru are 
presented in Table 8.      
 
For Paraguay, both regressions are significant (F test) with reasonably high (0.376, 0.397) 
adjusted R-squares (Table 9).  The coefficient for female land rights is negative but not 
significant in either model. As expected from the discussion of the descriptive statistics, the 
coefficient for sex of the household head (1 = female) is negative in Model 1, but not significant. 
Somewhat surprising is that, holding all else constant, NoMale is positively and significantly (if 
weakly) associated with higher net household income.  However, assets are not equally 
distributed;  households without a male own $46,000 less in assets leading to much lower 
average income levels among these households.  
 
 
20 The log transformation restricts the sample size, since households with negative incomes must 
be excluded.  However, the log transformation normalizes the distribution of net household 
income while at the same time facilitating the interpretation of the results, since the estimated 
coefficients are elasticities.  Since there may be unobserved household preferences which are 
correlated between women’s land rights and the generation of household income we tested for 
endogeneity but did not find it to be a problem in the regressions for either Paraguay or Peru.  
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In Model 1 the coefficients of  the value of farm assets and the years of schooling attained by the 
principal adult male and female of the household are positive and strongly significant.  The 
coefficients for household size and the number of economically active adults are also positive 
while more weakly significant; in Model 2 these coefficients, while still positive, lose 
significance. 
 
By region, the Minifundia zone (the oldest settled part of the country, centered on Asunción) is 
the default.  Only the coefficient for the Chaco region shows an increase in income over the 
Minifundia zone.  Farms in the Colonization region, in which the agrarian structure of the 
Minifundia zone has been replicated without the infrastructure of the latter, have significantly 
lower net household incomes.  The results for the Frontera region (on the frontier bordering 
Brazil, where export-oriented agriculture is concentrated) are contrary to expectations, showing a 
negative sign, but the coefficient is not significant. 
 
Turning to the income determination regressions for Peru (Table 10), these are also significant 
although the adjusted R-squares are lower than for Paraguay, suggesting that the models explain 
less of the variance in income levels for this country. The coefficient for  female land rights is 
positive, large and significant in both Model 1, where we control for sex of the household head 
and households without an adult male, and in Model 2, for the dual-headed households.  In 
Model 1, both female household headship and the absence of an adult male are negatively 
associated with net household income, but neither coefficient is significant. 
 
In both models net household income is positively and significantly associated with the number 
of working adults, the years of female schooling, and the value of farm assets, and negatively 
and significantly associated with distance to market.  In terms of regions, since the Coast is the 
default region, the coefficients for the Sierra and Selva regions are negative, as expected, 
although only that for the Sierra is significant, as the much poorer region.  
 
In sum, among peasant farmers in Peru, where the great majority of households are land-
constrained, female land rights are strongly associated with better outcomes for owner-operated 
farming households, at the mean, adding $572 (49.6 percent) to net household income in Model 
1 and $558 (47.4 percent) in Model 2.  In the more diverse farm sector of Paraguay, female land 
rights make virtually no difference. 
  
1. The Determinants of Farm Income.   
 
Net farm income is posited to be a function of the same independent variables as net household 
income, but several additional explanatory variables are included:  the number of crops (as a 
proxy for intensity or dedication to farming); and a dummy for whether a household member 
belongs to some form of agricultural organization (as a measure of social capital).  In addition, 
two additional sets of regressions include dummies for our constructed management variables 
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(based on labor time dedicated to agricultural production): joint management and female 
management (Models 3 and 4).21  (See Table 8 for means). 
  
As shown in Table 11, the farm income regressions for Paraguay are significant (F test) with a 
very high adjusted R-squared.  The results are more conclusive than the household income 
regressions for the coefficients for female land rights in Models 1 and 2 are significantly 
negative. In Model 1, female households heads are at a disadvantage in terms of farm income 
levels, but this coefficient is not significant; neither is the coefficient for NoMale although it is 
positively associated with the level of farm income.  
 
The coefficients of farm size, the value of farm assets, the number of crops, and membership in a 
farmers’ organization are all positive and significant in both models.  The number of working 
adults is also positive in both but only significant in Model 1.  Years of female schooling is 
always positive but significant only in Model 2, for dual-headed households. Surprisingly,  the 
coefficient for household size is negative but not significant.  By region, the Minifundia zone has 
the lowest farm income with all the other regions having significantly higher farm incomes.   
 
The negative impact of female land rights on farm incomes is quite large.  Estimated at the mean, 
female land rights reduces net farm income by 19.4 percent (Model 1) or 25.3 percent (Model 2). 
Clearly women face enormous challenges in making their land rights pay off.   The inclusion of 
the farm management variables (models 3 and 4, otherwise identical to models 1 and 2, 
respectively) reduces the size of the negative impact of female land rights, and removes the 
significance of the estimates.  Whereas joint management is positively, female management is 
negatively associated with net farm income, but neither coefficient is significant in either model. 
Female schooling is positive and significant in both models 3 and 4 while the significance of 
farmers’ organizations and the number of crops is weakened in these latter models. 
 
Turning to Peru, the farm income regressions are significant (F-test) but the adjusted R-squares 
are low, only slightly larger than those for net household income, suggesting that the models 
explain little of the variance in farm incomes, even when the management variables are included 
(Table 12).  All four models produce similar results with respect to the coefficient for female 
land rights which is now negative, but not significant.  The coefficient for female household 
heads is also negative but only significant in Model 3, when the management variables are 
 
21 We run separate regressions with the management variables since the number of observations 
is reduced substantially once these are included.  The missing observations correspond to cases 
where either the information on the EAP was incomplete or where the respondents were over 65 
years of age and thus the time that they dedicate to economic activities was not registered in the 
survey.   
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included.  In contrast to the case with net income, NoMale is positively related to the level of 
farm income in models 1 and 3, although the coefficients are not significant. 
 
In all the models net farm income is positively and significantly related to farm assets, farm size, 
and the number of crops grown.  The coefficients for household size, the number of working 
adults and membership in a farm organization switch signs in the various models, but are never 
significant.  As expected, the distance to market is negatively associated with farm income, but 
this coefficient was also not significant.  Female, but not male schooling, is positive related to 
farm income, but the coefficients are not significant.  The regional variables perform according 
to expectations, with the coefficient for the Sierra always being significantly negative. In models 
3 and 4, both management variables are negative but the coefficients are not significant.   
 
What is surprising is that for neither country did the management variables improve the 
explanatory power of the regressions of farm income levels.  Moreover, only for Paraguay was 
joint management positively associated with farm income, although the coefficient was not 
significant.  In both countries female-headed households are associated with lower levels of farm 
income, but significantly so only in the case of Peruvian Model 3, a result similar to that 
obtained by Corral and Reardon (2001: 440) for Nicaragua.  Worth exploring further is why the 
coefficient for female-headed households without a male is positively (but not significantly) 
associated with farm income levels.  
 
2.  The Determinants of Off-Farm Income 
 
The off-farm income regressions are similar to those for net household income; we compare a 
regression for the full sample (Model 1) with the restricted sample of dual-headed households 
(Model 2).  For Paraguay both regressions are significant (F test) with moderate adjusted R-
squares (Table 13).  The coefficient for female land rights is positive in both models but not 
significant.  As in the net income model, the coefficient for female heads in Model 1 is negative 
whereas for NoMale it is positive, but in the case of off-farm income these are not significant.   
 
The coefficients with the largest significant impact on off-farm income were the number of 
economically active adults, which was positive, and the size of the farm, which was negative.  
As expected, years of female and male schooling as well as the value of farm assets were 
positive and significant contributors to off-farm income, since schooling and assets should lead 
to greater income-earning opportunities off-farm.  Regional variations were important with 
households in the frontier and colonization zones having significantly smaller levels of off-farm 
income than those in the minifundia zone.  This result makes sense, since in these fairly remote 
regions opportunities for off-farm income earnings are relatively scarce.  
 
For Peru both off-farm income regressions are significant (F test) but report very low adjusted R-
squares (Table 14). We tested for and found endogeneity was present in our survey regression 
estimates.  We thus present results for an instrumented model, using instrumented variable 
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survey regression.22  The coefficient for female land rights is large and positive but significant 
only in Model 2.  This indicates that in dual-headed households, where female land rights can be 
associated with greater female bargaining power, female land rights contribute to generate higher 
levels of off-farm income.  Evaluated at the mean, female land rights add an additional $1,542 
(404.4 percent) to off-farm income.  In Model 1 female-headed households and those without a 
male are negatively associated with off-farm income levels, but neither coefficient is significant. 
 
 
22 We use the predicted values of the logit estimation of the determinants of female land rights, 
with marital status as the instrument (see Table 4).  We realize that this is not the ideal 
instrument, but because of data limitations had little choice. 
The other variables perform similarly in the two models.  Off-farm income levels are positively 
and significantly associated with household size, the number of economically active adults, and 
inversely associated with the distance from the main market.  Both male and female schooling, 
while positive, are not significant.  As in Paraguay, non-farm income levels are negatively 
associated with farm size, but for Peru this coefficient is not significant.  As expected, off-farm 
income levels are lower in the sierra and selva than on the coast, but only significantly so in the 
former case.   
 
Both Paraguay and Peru, hence, provide evidence that female land rights contribute to higher 
off-farm income although only in the case of dual-headed households in Peru is this result 
statistically significant.  The analysis of the descriptive statistics of the composition of income 
suggest that this positive effect is primarily because households with female land rights are more 
diversified than those without them.  What remains to be examined in future analyses is the 
precise ways in which women with land rights use their bargaining power to achieve higher off-
farm incomes.  Are they using their enhanced bargaining power to carry on their own more 
remunerative activities off the farm?  Alternative, does their stronger bargaining power allow 
them to stay at home, while their spouses pursue non-farm work?  In this paper we cannot 
explore the precise mechanisms, but the regression results suggest that these are fruitful 
questions to pursue.  
 
The Determinants of Farm Revenue in Brazil 
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As noted earlier, the Brazilian survey focused only on farm activities rather than household 
income generation.  Moreover, while the Peruvian and Paraguayan surveys included prices and 
costs of production, the Brazilian survey did not; a proxy for gross farm income was thus 
calculated using monthly, state-level prices for fifteen crops and milk production.23  The data set 
was reduced to include only those farms that produced some combination of the fifteen crops and 
milk.24  In order to distinguish between the estimates for Brazil and those for the other two 
countries, the following discussion will refer to farm revenue rather than income. 
 
The Brazil farm revenue regressions also differ slightly in the explanatory variables.  What made 
this data set of particular interest was that information on owner-managed farms and the gender 
of the owner and manager was elicited directly.  Thus dummy variables for owner-managers and 
female owner-managers are included in Models 1 and 2. Due to the design of the Brazilian 
survey, the sex of the household head is equivalent to the sex of the farm owners and there is 
little information about family level EAP or total farm assets.  However, the data do indicate the 
number of children of the owner working on the farm.25  The means of the variables are 
presented in Table 15.  As in the case of the other countries, two models are presented, one with 
the full sample (Model 1) and then for married farmers only (Model 2) (Table 16).26 Both 
regressions are significant at the 99 percent level of confidence and have adjusted R-squares of 
.40.   
 
The estimated coefficient of the female land rights dummy variable (FLR) is negatively signed in 
both models, but only significantly so in Model 1.   The impact is considerable; in the full 
sample, evaluated at the mean, female land rights reduce farm revenue by 33.2 percent.  The lack 
of significance of this coefficient in Model 2 suggests that married women farm owners may be 
 
23 Neither municipal-level prices nor prices for all types of reported farm activities were 
available.  The rationale for choosing a subset of fifteen crops was due to the set of crop prices 
available as well as the frequency of production.  The following were included: corn, beans, rice, 
soya, wheat, cotton, sugar, potatoes, onion, coffee, cocoa, sisal, cashew fruit, tobacco, and 
manioc. Monthly state-level prices were obtained from the Fundação Getúlio Vargas 
(www.fgv.com.br) and averaged over the period in which the survey was administered, between 
January 1998 and December 1999.   
 Livestock production presented a severe problem for not enough information (such as the 
age of the herd or its stage of production) is reported to calculate revenue, or the available prices 
did not correspond to the measures provided. Thus only milk production is included in the 
revenue estimates.  Limited availability of prices for all crops in each of the states further 
reduced the sample to 9,906 households; of these, 10.2 percent are female-owned farms and 89.8 
percent are male-owned.   
25 It is unknown how much or in what capacity the children are employed, or if they are paid or 
unpaid family workers.   
26 Robust standard errors are used to correct for heteroskedasticity.  Since the data are not 
weighted, survey regression (GLS) is not warranted.  While omitted variable bias is a problem, 
female land rights were tested for endogeneity but did not demonstrate this problem. 
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better off than female farm owners in general.  Certainly, women’s restricted access to 
productivity enhancing inputs and technical assistance warrants further investigation. 
 
The general management variable (MGR) is both significant and negatively signed.  In Model 1, 
owner-managers generate on average 31.6 percent less farm revenue, while in Model 2 they earn 
45.1 percent less than farms managed by others. Presumably, the latter are capitalist farms with a 
hired manager over-seeing wage workers.  Without attention to the crop mix or the levels of 
mechanization and use of other productivity enhancing inputs, however, it is unwise to draw firm 
conclusions. The coefficient of the female owner-manager dummy variable (F-MGR) is not 
significant in either model, but does change sign.  In the full sample, the coefficient is positive 
while for dual-headed households, the coefficient becomes negative.   
 
The results for both female land rights and the management variables should be interpreted with 
care because in the regressions we have not accounted for the costs of production, crop mix or 
the composition of the household.27  However, the outcomes with respect to both sets of 
variables are provocative.  In Model 1, where the estimated coefficient of FLR is negative and 
significant, the coefficient of F-MGR is positively signed.  In Model 2, FLR is negative but not 
significant while the coefficient of F-MGR is negatively signed.  The more general story of 
Model 1 seems to be that female owners who manage their own farms are better able to 
overcome their lack of access to productive inputs and smaller farm sizes than married women 
owner-managers. There is some suggestion that the latter either make different choices or that 
they can rely on fewer resources than when their husbands are the owner-managers. It is beyond 
the scope of this analysis to speculate further on gender-based preferences and disadvantages as 
they relate to marital status; however, there are important topics worthy of further exploration. 
 
In both models the main variables positively and significantly associated with farm revenue are 
membership in a farm organization and the number of crops.  The former indicates that the social 
capital provided by unions, cooperatives and associations are important to revenue generation.  
The positive relationship between the number of crops and farm revenue is consistent with the 
expectation that diverse production is associated with year-round production and therefore, 
higher revenue generation.28   
 
With respect to education, both male and female schooling is positively associated with farm 
revenue.  The estimated coefficient for male schooling is significant in both models, while that 
for female schooling is only significant in Model 1.  In neither case are they of much 
 
27 In alternative specifications of the models not reported here, the number of tractors and 
harvesters owned were included as independent variables.  Controlling for the degree of 
mechanization, the coefficient of FLR was not significant in either model while the coefficients 
estimated for the MGR and F-MGR dummy variables were essentially the same as described 
above. 
28 The surprisingly large coefficient should be interpreted with a grain of salt.  Likely, the 
problem of omitted variables underpins a large upward bias. 
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consequence; an additional year of female education, holding other factors constant, increases 
farm revenue by only 4.3 percent.  
 
The impact of the log of farm size and the squared term are as expected.  The log of farm size is 
always positively signed while the squared term is negative, but significant only in the case of 
Model 2.  At face value, this indicates that returns to scale diminish as farm size increases but the 
lack of data on livestock revenue likely overstates the effect of farm size on revenue for larger 
farms.  Of the regional dummies, it was expected that the North, Northeast and Center would be 
regions of lower revenue but that the coefficient on the Southeast would be positively signed 
because of its similarities to the region of reference (the South). The signs on the regional 
dummy variables are as anticipated except in the case of the North, which was positively signed. 
This may in part be due to the truncation of the data forced by the restricted availability of 
prices. While this means that the generalization of these results for all Brazilian farmers would 
be inappropriate, a closer inspection of the crop mix should shed light on this outcome. 
 
Preliminary means testing of farm revenue revealed sharp differences between male and female 
farmers and between female owner-managers and other farms, an outcome confirmed by the 
negatively signed and significant coefficient estimated for FLR in Model 1.  However, it is 
apparent that other factors are also important, and omitted variable bias may overestimate the 
negative impact of female land rights on farm revenue. Our results are inconclusive regarding the 
impact of female land rights on intrahousehold bargaining power, but it is apparent that future 
research should examine the extent to which women gain access to productivity enhancing 
inputs and training.  The consistently significant and positive relationship between social capital 
and the number of crops grown and the inconsistent results with respect to FLR and F-MGR 
lends support to the hypothesis that women are not inherently less productive or less successful 
than male farmers (Quisumbing 1996), but that they face different constraints than male farmers 
that may undermine the extent to which land rights impact upon bargaining power. 
 
 
 
Conclusions  
 
This paper has demonstrated that although female land rights are not always associated with 
higher household income levels, in certain contexts, such as among smallholders in Peru, they 
contribute to significantly higher household income levels.  Results for both Peru and Paraguay 
indicate that the positive impact of female land rights works primarily through off-farm income 
generating activities. The largest and most significant impact of female land rights was on off-
farm income levels among dual-headed households in Peru.   
 
Our main hypothesis with respect to dual-headed households was that female land rights should 
lead to higher household income levels primarily because the greater bargaining power of 
women landowners should lead to better household decision-making processes, thus improving 
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the efficiency of labor allocation.  The results for Peru, where the majority of female landowners 
reside in dual-headed households, support this proposition. Unfortunately, our surveys do not 
provide data on household decision-making processes.  Future work with these data sets, 
however, can explore the allocation of time of the adult couple to farm versus off-farm activities, 
providing a more comprehensive analysis of how female land rights impact upon labor 
allocation. 
 
The determinants of the different sources of non-farm income also need to be examined in more 
detail in future work. The descriptive statistics for Peru suggest that households with female land 
rights have both higher participation rates and earn higher mean incomes from non-agricultural 
wage employment, commerce and other independent sources of income than households without 
them.  In the case of Paraguay, the only source of income in which households with female land 
rights have the advantage over those that do not is with respect to remittances, suggesting that 
very different processes might explain why female land rights contribute to higher levels of off-
farm income.  It may be, for example, that in Paraguay, given fewer opportunities for female off-
farm employment, female land rights lead to higher off-farm income levels primarily because 
women with land can attract partners who are willing to migrate seasonally and send home 
remittances, or because mothers have greater bargaining power over their children who migrate 
to do the same.  In contrast, in Peru female land rights might be what make the difference in rural 
women being able to pursue high productivity versus the low productivity off-farm activities so 
often associated with female off-farm employment (Lanjouw 2001; Elbers and Lanjouw 2001).   
 
In both Paraguay and Peru female land rights were negatively associated with the level of farm 
income, in Paraguay, with its heterogeneous agrarian class structure, significantly so. The results 
for Brazil indicate that female land rights are negatively associated with the level of farm 
revenue. One of our primary interests in exploring the Brazil data was to study the effect of the 
manager variable, since it is not only land ownership, but control over land and its uses and fruits 
that should lead to better outcomes for women.  The results for Brazil nonetheless were 
inconclusive, with the coefficients for female owner-managers not being significant and 
changing signs in the two models.  For Paraguay and Peru, where the management variable was 
constructed on the basis of labor time dedicated to agriculture, the coefficients for joint and 
female management were never significant.  Nonetheless, the positive sign on joint management 
in the Paraguayan case is worth noting.  Obviously, more rigorous work on the impact of female 
land rights will require better surveys that directly measure the relationship between land 
ownership and its control.  
 
A surprising result was that, controlling for female land rights, female-headed households were 
not always at a disadvantage.  The coefficient for self-declared female-headed households in 
both Paraguay and Peru was always negatively related to the level of net household, farm and 
off-farm income, but significantly so in only one case (farm income levels in Peru in Models 3 
and 4).  The results differed for those female-headed households with no adult male present. In 
Paraguay there was a positive and significant association between households with no male 
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present and net household income levels. But on closer inspection this positive association in 
Paraguay may be due to the fact that many female-headed households with no adult male present 
are made up of married women or those in consensual unions (15 percent of the total number of 
single female heads) whose partners may be only temporarily away, for these households rely 
heavily on remittances.29  The Paraguayan case well illustrates the importance of scrutinizing the 
composition of self-declared female-headed households not only to distinguish between those 
that have an adult male present and those who do not, but also to distinguish those who are 
reliant on income transfers from absent males. 
 
Another concern is that land rights may be endogenous to household formation, being the factor 
that allows some women to either remain single or to leave an unsatisfactory relationship.  This 
makes it difficult to interpret the results with respect to the impact of land ownership on the 
welfare of single, female-headed households, since our sub-sample of rural households is made 
up only of land-owning households.  The more relevant comparison in terms of household 
income levels would be between rural female household heads (with and without a male present) 
who own and do not own land.   
 
The results on the impact of schooling confirm the importance of female education to rural 
household welfare, particularly where the gender gap in schooling is large.  In the Peruvian and 
Paraguayan regressions female years of schooling was positively and significantly related to the 
level of household income.  For Paraguay, this result held in terms of farm and off-farm income 
levels as well, while for Peru, while the relationship was positive, the coefficients were not 
significant. In the Brazilian farm revenue regressions both female and male education was 
positively and significantly associated with higher income in the full model, while in the case of 
married landowners, only the coefficient for years of male schooling was significant. 
 
Rigorous, comparative analysis obviously depends on the quality of the data and the extent to 
which household data sets are comparable.  While the inclusion of data that allows the estimation 
of female land rights in the Paraguayan and Peruvian LSMS is a step forward, the questionnaires 
do not illicit comparable data, with data on ownership by gender at the preferred, parcel level 
only being collected in Peru.  Another inconsistency between these two data sets is in terms of 
the availability of data on how land was acquired, with this information only included in the 
Peruvian case. Moreover, in neither data set is information collected on intra-generational 
mobility, such as parents’ ownership of land, hampering efforts to estimate the determinants of 
female land ownership.  
 
Neither LSMS questionnaire includes any questions at all regarding household or farm decision-
making, which is a severe limitation to rigorously testing the bargaining power approach.  
Further, until recently the household bargaining power literature had largely ignored the property 
 
29 Cross-tabs reveal that among female heads with no male present in the household, remittances 
in Paraguay are the primary income source only among married women and those in consensual 
unions; for widows they rank fourth and for single women, third among income sources. 
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rights that govern marriage.  Since households may often choose among various options, it is 
imperative that household questionnaires ask couples under what marital regime they have 
married and distinguish between formally married couples and consensual unions.   Finally, 
another problem apparent in this study is the difficulty of comparing rural households in 
countries with such different agrarian structures. 
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Table 1:  Key Independent Variables, Owner-Operated Farms 
      Brazil Paraguay Peru 
Share of Households:     Mean Land   Mean Land   Mean Land
        Percentage Owned  Percentage Owned   Percentage Owned
with Female Land Only       28.0% 11.1  11.5% 2.56 
with Male Land Only      69.2% 21.6  71.5% 3.38 
with Mixed Ownership  same as with and without  2.8% 11.3  3.0% 3.68 
with Joint Ownership  land rights  _____ ____  14.0% 4.53
   Total     100.0% 18.4  100.0% 3.46 
            **    n.s. 
                      
with Female Land Rights   10.5% 313.4  30.8% 11.1  28.5% 3.64 
w/out Female Land Rights   89.5% 326.4  69.2% 21.6  71.5% 3.38
   Total   100.0% 325.1  100.0% 18.4  100.0% 3.46 
         *    **    n.s. 
           
with Female Head    10.5% 313.4  24.6% 9.3  8.9% 2.81 
with Male Head    89.5% 326.4  75.4% 21.4  91.1% 3.83
   Total   100.0% 325.1  100.0% 18.4  100.0% 3.46 
        (n=28,805) *  (n=1,678) ***   (n=871) n.s. 
             
with Female Managera    7.1% 304.6  15.3% 9.3  21.8% 2.71 
with Male Manager    92.9% 320.9  54.5% 32.9  56.1% 4.10 
with Joint Management       -        -     30.2% 18.7  22.1% 2.59
   Total   100.0% 319.8  100.0% 25.0  100.0% 3.46 
        (n=24,140) ***  (n=990) ***   (n=762) n.s. 
         
Notes:           
***  Statistically significant at 99% confidence level      
**   Statistically significant at 95% confidence level      
*    Statistically significant at 90% confidence level      
n.s. = Difference in means not statistically significant      
a For Brazil, manager refers to self-declared owner-administrators; for Paraguay and Peru estimate based on   
  "labor theory of management." In the case of the latter countries, the sample size is reduced due to missing information 
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Table 2: Form of Acquisition of Land by Women Landowners 
    Brazil Peru 
            
Inheritance 1,435 317 
    (51.1%) (54.7%) 
Community  -  14 
        (2.4%) 
Market   1,029 203 
    (36.6%) (35.1%) 
Agrarian Reform 13 40 
    (0.5%) (6.9%) 
Other   194 5 
    (6.9%) (0.9%) 
Multiple Forms 137  -  
    (4.9%)         
  Total 2,811 579 
    (100.0%) (100.0%)
   
Note: For Brazil, refers to acquisition of farm; for Peru 
 to acquisition of parcels by 248 women landowners
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Table 3: Marital Status of Women Landowners 
  Single Widowed Divorced Separated Married Consensual Total 
            Union   
Brazil 394 1,295 171 38 913  -  2,811
  14.0% 46.1% 6.1% 1.3% 32.5%   100.0%
Paraguay 80 121 1 23 166 118 509
  15.7% 23.8% 0.2% 4.5% 32.7% 23.1% 100.0%
Peru 13 46  -  14 124 50 246
  5.1% 18.5%   5.7% 50.4% 20.3% 100.0%
        
        
Note: In the Brazilian questionnaire, married couples and consensual unions  
 were considered as one category.   
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Table 4: Determinants of Female Land Rights 
BRAZIL PARAGUAY PERU 
Logit estimates: FLR Logit estimates: FLR Logit estimates: FLR 
Number of obs      8,852 Number of obs   1,563 Number of obs   816
LR chi2(4)         1,501.96 Wald chi2(5)   185.34 Wald chi2(5)   68.39
Prob > chi2       0.00 Prob > chi2   0.00 Prob > chi2   0.00
Pseudo R2      0.26 Pseudo R2   0.37 Pseudo R2   0.15
Log likelihood   -2,113.01 Log likelihood   -621.58 Log likelihood   -424.05
                  
FLR Coef. P>z      FLR Coef. P>z FLR Coef. P>z 
Constant -0.73 0.000*** Constant -1.57 0.080* Constant -2.15 0.070* 
      SexHead 2.84 0.000*** SexHead 3.98 0.000*** 
Female Age -0.02 0.000*** FemaleAge 0.02 0.030** FemaleAge 0.02 0.000*** 
Female Primary 0.19 0.090* FemaleLiteracy 0.41 0.220 FemaleLiteracy 0.08 0.730 
F-Married -1.76 0.000*** F-Married -1.55 0.030** F-Married 0.16 0.889 
F-Widowed 1.705753 0.000*** F-Widowed -0.10 0.890 F-Widowed -0.70 0.454 
         
Notes:         
n.a. = not available         
***  = statistically significant at 99% confidence level      
**   = statistically significant at 95% confidence level      
*    = statistically significant at 90% confidence level      
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Table 5:  Net Household Income, Net Income per Capita and Income Quintiles by Female Land 
Rights (US$) 
  BRAZILa PARAGUAYb PERUc
  Some FLR No FLR Total Some FLR No FLR Total Some FLR No FLR Total 
Net HH Y $6,787 $7,897 $7,780*** $5,563 $7,260 $6,736* $2,440 $1,771 $1,962***
  (n=3,026) (n=25,779) (n=28,805) (n=518) (n=1,160) (n=1,678) (n=244) (n=626) (n=870) 
Net HH Y     $1,475 $1,730 $1,651 $560 $411 $453*** 
per capita   
n.a. 
  (n=518) (n=1,160) (n=1,678) (n=244) (n=626) (n=870) 
                    
Quintiles Some FLR No FLR   Some FLR No FLR   Some FLR No FLR   
Bottom 20% 21 20  18 21  14 22  
Second 20% 21 20  23 18  13 23  
Middle 20% 21 20  21 20  21 20  
Fourth 20% 20 20  20 20  22 19  
Top 20% 17 20  18 21  30 16  
Total 100 100  100 100  100 100  
  (n=3,026) (n=25,779)  (n=518) (n=1,160)  (n=248) (n=623)  
  ***   n.s.   ***   
Notes:
n.a. = not available 
***  = statistically significant at 99% confidence level 
**   = statistically significant at 95% confidence level 
*    = statistically significant at 90% confidence level 
a Based on exchange rate of US$ = 1.82 Reais, average of 1999-2000; from IMF (2001:301). 
b Based on exchange rate of US$ = 3,768.9 Guaranis, average for 2000-01; from www.fxhisty.com 
c Based on exchange rate of US$ = 3.48 Soles, average during survey period in 2000; from www.mef.gob.pe 
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            Table 6: Composition of Net Household Income by Female Land Rights, Paraguay   
    Female Land Rights   No Female Land Rights   TOTAL   
INCOME 
SOURCE No. Farms  Mean No. Farms  Mean No. Farms  Mean  
    (incidence)  (composition)  (incidence)      (composition)  (incidence) (composition)
518   $1,471.42 *** 1160   $3,665.84 *** 1678   $2,988.98 ***Net Farm Income 
100.0%   26.5%   100.0%   50.5%   100.0%   44.4%   
59  $94.53   103   $117.23   162   $110.22   Agric.Wage 
Income 11.5%   1.7%   8.9%   1.6%   9.7%   1.6%   
209   $1,336.48   414   $1,226.32   623   $1,260.30   Non-Ag Wage 
Income 40.4% * 24.0%   35.6% * 16.9%   37.1% * 18.7%   
134   $421.25   288   $365.43   422   $382.64   Commerce 
Income 25.9%   7.6%   24.8%   5.0%   25.1%   5.7%   
174   $682.05   320   $420.17   494   $500.94   Other 
Independent 
Income 33.6% ** 12.3%   27.5% ** 5.8%   29.4% ** 7.4%   
468   $81.04   1009   $103.05   1477   $96.26   Rental Income 
90.5% ** 1.5%   86.9% ** 1.4%   88.1% ** 1.4%   
210   $456.72 *** 279   $217.67 *** 489   $291.41 ***Remittances 
40.7% *** 8.2%   24.0% *** 3.0%   29.2% *** 4.3%   
366   $1,019.37   754   $1,144.09   1120   $1,105.62   Other 
70.8% ** 18.3%   64.9% ** 15.8%   66.7% ** 16.4%   
518   $5,562.85 * 1160   $7,259.79 * 1678   $6,736.38 * Net Household 
Income 100   100.0%   100.0%   100.0%   100.0%   100.0%   
Notes:              
*** Means (or X2 test of incidence)  are statistically significant across categories at the 99% confidence level    
**   Means (or X2 test of incidence)  are statistically significant across categories at the 95% confidence level    
*    Means (or X2 test of incidence)  are statistically significant across categories at the 90% confidence level    
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Table 7: Composition of Net Household Income by Female Land Rights, Peru   
    Female Land Rights   No Female Land Rights   TOTAL   
INCOME SOURCE No. Farms  Mean No. Farms  Mean No. Farms  Mean  
    (incidence)  (composition)  (incidence)  (composition)  (incidence)  (composition)  
244***       $695.26 627*** $595.95 871*** $624.23Net Farm Income 
100.0%  28.5%  100.0%  33.5%  100.0%  31.8%  
36  $111.75 95  $124.54 131  $120.90  Agric.Wage 
Income 14.8%  4.6%  15.2%  7.0%  15.0%  6.2%  
60**      $525.19** 101** $276.77** 161** $347.47**Non-Ag Wage 
Income 24.6%  21.5%  16.0%  15.5%  18.5%  17.6%  
52**      $338.38* 110** $203.38* 162** $241.80*Commerce 
Income 21.3%  13.9%  17.5%  11.5%  18.6%  12.3%  
78  $280.27** 169  $173.36** 247  $203.79** Other 
Independent 
Income 32.0%  11.5%  27.0%  9.7%  28.4%  10.4%  
233  $213.18 600  $178.95 833  $188.69  Rental Income 
95.5%  8.7%  95.7%  10.1%  95.6%  9.5%  
22**       $81.10 34** $62.77 56** $67.99Remittances 
9.0%  3.3%  5.0%  3.5%  6.4%  3.5%  
186  $195.00 498  $161.37 684  $170.95  Other 
76.2%  8.0%  79.4%  9.1%  78.5%  8.7%  
244***      $2,440.14*** 627*** $1,770.96*** 871*** $1,961.54***Net Household 
Income 100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  
Notes:              
*** Means (or X2 test of incidence)  are statistically significant across categories at the 99% confidence level    
**   Means (or X2 test of incidence)  are statistically significant across categories at the 95% confidence level    
*    Means (or X2 test of incidence)  are statistically significant across categories at the 90% confidence level    
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Table 8: Income Regression Means 
Paraguay  Peru
  All Households   
Dual 
Households  All Households
Dual 
Households 
Variable       Obs Mean Obs Mean Variables: Obs Mean Obs Mean
Net HH Income (US$) 1552 $6,918 1267 $7,392 Net HH Income (US$) 815 $1,992 740 $2,026
Net Farm Income (US$) 1548 $3,081 1263 $3,497 Net Farm Income (US$) 815 $638 740 $663 
Net Off-Farm Income (US$) 1548 $3,845 1263 $3,903 Net Off-Farm Income (US$) 815 $1,354 740 $1,363
Female Land Rights (FLR) 1552 33.0% 1267 19.7% Female Land Rights (FLR) 815 30.4% 740 24.3% 
Female Household Head 1552 26.7% 1267 10.2% SexHead 815 9.5% 740 0.6% 
Household Size 1552 5.06 1267 5.28 Household Size 815 5.19 740 5.33 
Economically Active Adults 1552 3.68 1267 3.81 Economically Active Adults 815 2.36 740 2.41 
Joint Managers 903 31.9% 797 33.6% Joint Managers 714 22.9% 740 24.1% 
Male Managers 903 51.4% 797 52.4% Male Managers 714 54.5% 653 57.7% 
Female Managers 903 16.7% 797 14.0% Female Managers 714 22.6% 653 18.2% 
Female Years of Schooling 1552 5.28 1267 5.42 Female Years of Schooling 815 5.01 740 5.18 
Male Years of Schooling 1267 5.91 1267 5.91 Male Years of Schooling 815 7.09 740 7.79 
No Male in HH 1552 18.4% 1267 0.0% No Male in HH 815 9.0% 740 0.0% 
Value of Assets 1552 $41,922 1267 $50,358 Value of Assets 809 $4,592 734 $4,316 
Farm Size (hectares) 1552 20.28 1267 22.73 Farm Size (hectares) 815 3.79 740 3.89 
Cropped Area (hectares) 1552 6.63 1267 7.86 Cropped Area (hectares) 788 4.00 720 4.23 
Number of Crops 1552 4.03 1267 4.42 Number of Crops 815 3.75 740 3.85 
Members of Farm Orgs. 1552 2.0% 1267 1.7% Members of Farm Orgs. 815 42.1% 740 42.8% 
Distance to Market (minutes) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. Distance to Market (minutes) 815 72.39 740 71.87 
Minifundia     1552 58.1% 56.8%1267 Sierra 815 69.1%69.0% 740
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Table 8: Income Regression Means, continued 
Paraguay  Peru
Colonizacion      1552 14.8% 15.7%1267 Selva 815 0.2% 740 0.2%
Frontera       1552 25.6% 1267 25.9% Coast 815 30.8%30.8% 740
Chaco 1552 1.5% 1267 1.5%           
Note:          
n.a. = not available          
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Table  9: Net Household Income Regression Results, Paraguay 
  1 Prob > F 2 Prob > F 
F 55.67 0 *** 46.41 0 *** 
Deg Freedom 606     564     
R-squared 0.373     0.388     
              
logNHHY Coef. P>t Coef. P>t 
Constant 6.746 0 *** 6.754 0 *** 
FLR -0.036 0.716   -0.075 0.494   
SexHead -0.189 0.186         
logHHSize 0.256 0.065 * 0.200 0.196   
logAdultEAP 0.241 0.065 * 0.142 0.347   
logFSchool 0.039 0 *** 0.046 0 *** 
logMSchool 0.066 0.001 *** 0.065 0.004 *** 
NoMale 0.283 0.065 *       
logAssets 0.077 0.004 *** 0.105 0.001 *** 
logFarmSize 0.026 0.292   0.014 0.616   
logFarmSizeSQR 0.059 0 *** 0.059 0 *** 
Colon -0.179 0.013 ** -0.164 0.034 ** 
Frontera -0.064 0.372   -0.004 0.967   
Chaco 0.279 0.017 ** 0.421 0.001 *** 
       
Notes:       
***  Statistically significant at 99% confidence level   
**   Statistically significant at 95% confidence level   
*    Statistically significant at 90% confidence level   
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Table 10: Net Household Income Regression Results, Peru 
  1 Prob > F 2 Prob>F 
F 19.89 0.000*** 19.52 0.000*** 
Degrees of Freedom 763   696   
R-squared 0.228   0.216   
          
logNHHY Coef P>t Coef P>t 
Constant 6.473 0.000*** 6.533 0.000*** 
FLR 0.403 0.000*** 0.388 0.000*** 
SexHead -0.135 0.795     
logHHSize 0.137 0.168 0.051 0.650 
logAdultEAP 0.408 0.000*** 0.410 0.000*** 
logFSchool 0.036 0.008*** 0.039 0.008*** 
logMSchool 0.013 0.459 0.012 0.491 
NoMale -0.056 0.918     
logAssets 0.131 0.000*** 0.145 0.000*** 
logFarmSize 0.041 0.217 0.040 0.270 
logFarmSizeSQR 0.016 0.064* 0.015 0.145 
logDistance -0.130 0.001*** -0.135 0.001*** 
Sierra -0.718 0.000*** -0.711 0.000*** 
Selva -0.147 0.214 -0.151 0.232 
     
     
Notes:     
*** Statistically significant at the 99% confidence level  
**   Statistically significant at the 95% confidence level  
*    Statistically significant at the 90% confidence level  
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Table 11: Farm Income Regression Results, Paraguay 
  1 Prob>F 2 Prob>F 3 Prob>F 4 Prob>F 
F 176.3 0 *** 185.31 0 *** 86.05 0 *** 74.29 0 *** 
Deg Freedom 589     546     397     375     
R-squared 0.756     0.767     0.643     0.629     
                          
logFarmIncome Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t 
Constant 4.372 0 *** 4.670 0 *** 4.725 0 *** 4.747 0 *** 
FLR -0.216 0.071 * -0.291 0.079 * -0.008 0.959   -0.030 0.851   
SexHead -0.274 0.329         -0.052 0.661         
logHHSize -0.280 0.19   -0.349 0.137   -0.197 0.296   -0.264 0.175   
logAdultEAP 0.550 0.031 ** 0.497 0.102   0.370 0.145   0.448 0.111   
MgrJoint             0.080 0.219   0.071 0.321   
MgrFemale             -0.500 0.103   -0.513 0.158   
logFSchool 0.008 0.561   0.019 0.081 * 0.021 0.044 ** 0.018 0.075 * 
logMSchool -0.020 0.237   -0.020 0.224   -0.004 0.794   0.000 0.983   
NoMale 0.353 0.296         0.159 0.296         
logAssets 0.227 0 *** 0.207 0.001 *** 0.211 0.093 * 0.202 0.122   
logFarmSize 0.313 0 *** 0.349 0 *** 0.363 0 *** 0.394 0 *** 
logFarmSizeSQR 0.045 0 *** 0.039 0 *** 0.037 0 *** 0.032 0 *** 
logNCrops 0.070 0 *** 0.067 0 *** 0.009 0.595   0.011 0.58   
FarmOrg 0.351 0.011 ** 0.384 0.011 ** 0.253 0.133   0.332 0.08 * 
Colon 0.309 0.002 *** 0.321 0.001 *** 0.192 0.038 ** 0.219 0.019 ** 
Frontera 0.206 0.041 ** 0.216 0.038   0.137 0.128   0.157 0.092 * 
Chaco 0.403 0.188   0.545 0.12   0.467 0.336   0.484 0.353   
Notes:             
*** Statistically significant at the 99% confidence level         
**   Statistically significant at the 95% confidence level         
*    Statistically significant at the 90% confidence level         
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Table 12: Farm Income Regression Results, Peru 
  1 Prob>F 2 Prob>F 3 Prob>F 4 Prob>F 
F 20.94 0.000*** 20.47 0.000*** 16.4 0.000*** 16.59 0.000*** 
Deg Freedom 659   609   586   541   
R-squared 0.292   0.302   0.279   0.287   
                  
logFarmIncome Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>t 
Constant 3.875 0.000*** 3.839 0.000*** 4.266 0.000*** 4.095 0.000*** 
FLR -0.136 0.356 -0.190 0.203 -0.105 0.517 -0.148 0.370 
SexHead -0.510 0.210     -0.648 0.057*     
logHHSize 0.053 0.673 -0.002 0.991 -0.031 0.810 -0.089 0.543 
logAdultEAP -0.036 0.793 0.023 0.872 -0.008 0.959 0.037 0.814 
MgrJoint         -0.069 0.679 -0.056 0.744 
MgrFemale         -0.136 0.354 -0.069 0.660 
logFSchool 0.026 0.127 0.029 0.111 0.020 0.253 0.026 0.174 
logMSchool -0.012 0.596 -0.014 0.549 0.000 0.989 -0.004 0.866 
NoMale 0.148 0.759     0.366 0.393     
logAssets 0.312 0.000*** 0.336 0.000*** 0.281 0.000*** 0.323 0.000*** 
logFarmSize 0.108 0.014** 0.129 0.007*** 0.134 0.004*** 0.145 0.005*** 
logFarmSizeSQR 0.025 0.08* 0.026 0.147 0.029 0.052* 0.027 0.152 
logNCrops 0.374 0.000*** 0.371 0.000*** 0.265 0.017** 0.274 0.016** 
FarmOrg 0.032 0.788 -0.009 0.940 0.002 0.985 -0.042 0.746 
logDistance -0.037 0.508 -0.065 0.245 -0.031 0.594 -0.059 0.316 
Sierra -0.980 0.000*** -0.933 0.000*** -0.819 0.000*** -0.791 0.000*** 
Selva -0.229 0.235 -0.244 0.236 -0.148 0.454 -0.155 0.466 
         
Notes:         
*** Statistically significant at the 99% confidence level     
**   Statistically significant at the 95% confidence level     
*    Statistically significant at the 90% confidence level     
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Table 13: Net Off-Farm Income Regression Results, Paraguay 
  1 Prob > F 2 Prob > F 
F 26.28 0 *** 25.32 0 *** 
Deg Freedom 600     557     
R-squared 0.203     0.211     
              
logOffFarmIncome Coef. P>t Coef. P>t 
Constant 5.671 0.000 *** 5.491 0.000 *** 
FLR 0.145 0.357   0.176 0.281   
SexHead -0.071 0.781         
logHHSize 0.188 0.353   0.086 0.709   
logAdultEAP 0.415 0.036 ** 0.427 0.074 * 
logFSchool 0.068 0.000 *** 0.083 0.001 *** 
logMSchool 0.094 0.001 *** 0.088 0.004 *** 
NoMale 0.353 0.164         
logAssets 0.112 0.010 * 0.162 0.003 *** 
logFarmSize -0.256 0.000 *** -0.298 0.000 *** 
logFarmSizeSQR 0.048 0.000 *** 0.049 0.000 *** 
Colon -0.485 0.006 *** -0.543 0.005 *** 
Frontera -0.359 0.016 ** -0.335 0.055 * 
Chaco 0.048 0.877   0.187 0.593   
       
Notes:       
*** Statistically significant at the 99% confidence level   
**   Statistically significant at the 95% confidence level   
*    Statistically significant at the 90% confidence level   
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               Table 14 : Net Off-Farm Income Regression Results, Peru 
  1 Prob>F 2 Prob>F 
F 6.76 0.000*** 6.8 0.000*** 
Degrees of Freedom 787   717   
R-squared 0.146   0.160   
          
logOffFarmIncome Coef. P>t Coef. P>t 
Constant 5.865 0.000*** 5.897 0.000*** 
FLR 1.674 0.214 1.618 0.048**  
SexHead -0.428 0.726     
logHHSize 0.444 0.028** 0.389 0.034**  
logAdultEAP 0.471 0.048** 0.496 0.010*** 
logFSchool 0.011 0.461 0.007 0.622 
logMSchool 0.014 0.620 0.018 0.509 
NoMale -0.250 0.748     
logAssets 0.017 0.830 0.027 0.663 
logFarmSize -0.051 0.227 -0.049 0.264 
logFarmSizeSQR 0.007 0.511 0.007 0.586 
logDistance -0.173 0.002*** -0.190 0.001*** 
Sierra -0.512 0.002*** -0.480 0.006*** 
Selva -0.170 0.309 -0.133 0.460 
     
Notes:     
*** Statistically significant at the 99% confidence level   
**   Statistically significant at the 95% confidence level   
*    Statistically significant at the 90% confidence level   
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             Table 15: Farm Revenue Regression Means, Brazil 
  Model 1 Model 2 
Variable Obs Mean Obs Mean 
Farm Revenue 6987 $183,374.87 5681 $201,028.80
Flr  6987 0.10 5681 0.04
F-Mgr 6987 0.06 5681 0.03
Mgr 6987 0.86 5681 0.89
Age 6987 60.49 5681 60.31
EAPchild+.001 6987 1.02 5681 1.07
F-School 688 2.87 199 3.03
M-School 6299 2.84 5482 2.86
FarmOrg 6987 0.60 5681 0.62
N-Crops 6987 2.96 5681 3.01
Farm Size (Ha) 6987 306.92 5681 301.82
Farm Size SQ 6987 202819.30 5681 196919.13
Southeast 6987 0.14 5681 0.14
Center 6987 0.17 5681 0.17
Northeast 6987 0.44 5681 0.43
North  6987 0.03 5681 0.03
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Table 16: Farm Revenue Regression Results, Brazil 
Model 1 Model 2 
OLS_Robust   Prob > F OLS_Robust   Prob > F 
F 463.61 0.00 ** F 371.23 0.00 *** 
DF 6971   DF 5665   
Adj R-squared 0.40   Adj R-squared 0.40   
            
Log Farm Revenue Coef. P>t   Log Farm Revenue Coef. P>t   
Constant 2.48 0.07 * Constant 2.22 0.14   
Flr -0.40 0.05 ** Flr -0.12 0.77   
Mgr -0.27 0.02 ** Mgr -0.32 0.01 ** 
F-Mgr 0.10 0.69   F-Mgr -0.37 0.43   
Log Age -0.13 0.38   Log Age 0.01 0.94   
logEAPchild 0.00 0.88   logEAPchild 0.01 0.44   
Log F-School 0.04 0.04 ** Log F-School 0.04 0.44   
Log M-School 0.02 0.00 *** Log M-School 0.02 0.01 ** 
FarmOrg 0.41 0.00 *** FarmOrg 0.48 0.00 *** 
Log N-Crops 3.75 0.00 *** Log N-Crops 3.71 0.00 *** 
Log Size 0.80 0.08 * Log Size 0.66 0.19   
Log Size SQ -0.09 0.02 ** Log Size SQ -0.08 0.09 * 
Southeast 0.09 0.48   Southeast 0.06 0.67   
Center -1.11 0.00 *** Center -1.18 0.00 *** 
Northeast -1.49 0.00 *** Northeast -1.62 0.00 *** 
North  0.70 0.01 ** North  0.66 0.02 ** 
        
Notes:        
*** Statistically significant at the 99% confidence level    
**   Statistically significant at the 95% confidence level    
*    Statistically significant at the 90% confidence level    
 
